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When re-examining the endless debate over the prospects of and limits to Europe’s
international consolidation after the First World War, the crucible of the twentieth
century, what still needs re-evaluation is not so much the crisis and eventual
breakdown of European and world order. Rather, what seems as yet insufficiently
explained is the opposite: the fact that, even though it ultimately proved unsustainable
under the onslaughts of the 1930s, any stability could be attained in the widened
Euro-Atlantic state-system of the 1920s.1
It is in fact neither a contingent nor a rare phenomenon in history that
fundamental crises – notably ever less controllable wars – have given rise to substantial
reorientations not only in the underlying ideas but also in the practice of international
politics. Time and again, such reorientations have animated efforts to find new
answers to the perennial yet also ever changing question of how to create a more
durable international order after war.2 As Paul W. Schroeder has shown, the Vienna
system of 1814/15, following decades of revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, derived
its longevity from precisely such a transformation.3
Most retrospective analyses assert that the First World War, a catastrophe far
surpassing the turmoil of the Napoleonic era, did not spur anything like the
1 Cf. the underlying premise of Charles Maier’s seminal study Recasting Bourgeois Europe. Stabilisation in
France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade After World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 3.
2 For the wider context see G. J. Ikenberry, After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding
of World Order After Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); P. M. Kennedy and W. I.
Hitchcock, eds., From War to Peace: Altered Strategic Landscapes in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2000).
3 P. W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994).
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diplomatic ‘revolution’ of 1814/15. Is it thus to be concluded that those who tried to
stabilise Europe before the Great Depression, particularly British and American policy
makers, were unable to make noteworthy headway in this direction? Or, following
more recent interpretations, was the decade after 1918 so overwhelmingly dominated
by economic problems and constraints that ultimately no peace could endure?4
Those enumerating the shortcomings of Anglo-American policies after 1918
have expounded the lessons of Europe’s ‘illusory peace’ between 1919 and 1933 –
lessons which were only, and belatedly, learned after 1945.5 The following analysis
seeks to re-assess what came closest to a sustainable Euro-Atlantic peace system, a
framework for Europe’s political and economic consolidation, after 1918.6 Was it,
however imperfect, the system of 1919? Or did the modicum of European pacification
achieved in the 1920s rather result from a recasting of transatlantic international
politics that, five years after Versailles, produced two new, qualitatively different
international settlements? Can the 1924 London reparations accords and the 1925
security pact of Locarno be characterised as the ‘real’ post-First World War peace
agreements? An answer may be found by determining which policies were most
conducive to settling what arguably lay at the epicentre of Europe’s disorder: the
problem of how the vanquished Germany, the burdened Weimar Republic, could
be reintegrated into a viable international order without jeopardising the security of
France. This was in short the Franco-German question of the 1920s.
The solidity and degree of Europe’s ‘relative’ pacification after the First World
War have remained the subject of far-ranging debate. Less prominent in more recent
scholarship on London and Locarno has been the ‘idealist’ critique which posits that
both accords prevented the League of Nations from developing its full potential –
from becoming an effective agency of collective security fortifying European peace.7
Recent interpretations have highlighted the structural impediments to lasting peace
after 1919: on the one hand, the allegedly irreconcilable differences between status
quo and revisionist powers, particularly France and Germany, and on the other,
the severe financial constraints imposed by international debts and the unresolved
reparations problem.8 Did policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic ultimately
4 See N. Ferguson, ‘The German Inter-War Economy: Political Choice vs. Economic Determinism’,
in M. Fulbrook, ed., German History since 1800 (London: Arnold, 1997), 258–78; G. D. Feldman, The
Great Disorder. Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1993); S. A. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1976); K. Burk, ‘Economic Diplomacy between the Wars’, Historical Journal 24 (1981),
1003–15.
5 See S. Marks, The Illusion of Peace. International Relations in Europe, 1918–1933 (London: Macmillan,
1976), 143–6.
6 This article is based on a dissertation completed by the author at Oxford University in October
2001: ‘The Unfinished Transatlantic Peace Order after World War I. Britain, the United States and the
Franco-German Question, 1923–1925’.
7 Cf. Z. Steiner, ‘The League of Nations and the Quest for Security’, in M. Howard et al. (eds.), The
Quest for Stability. Problems of West European Security, 1918–1957 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),
35–70.
8 Cf. C. S. Maier, ‘The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in 20th-Century
Western Europe’, American Historical Review, 86 (1981), 327–52; I. Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation.
International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 75–98.
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have no, or only very limited, scope in sustaining peace because the economic and
power-political odds were so stacked against it?9 Did key decisions affecting European
stability lie not so much in the hands of governments but in those of transnationally
operating financiers, who pursued other primary interests? Or was there an even
more fundamental contradiction between Anglo-US financial interests in revitalising
Germany and the requirements of a ‘sound’ balance-of-power system which would
prevent Germany’s resurgence?
The last question points to the ‘realist’ critique, which is probably most influential
in shaping today’s understanding of 1920s international history. It hinges on the claim,
made through the prism of the 1930s, that the agreements of 1924–5 represented the
culmination of delusory Anglo-US attempts to ‘appease’ Weimar Germany. Probably
the most forceful ‘realist’ interpretation is Stephen Schuker’s thesis, that Anglo-US
politicians and financiers, in forcing the 1924 Dawes settlement on France, destroyed
Europe’s best hope for stability: France’s bid to found security on a contained and
fragmented Germany. The Locarno pact10 merely sealed this fateful development.
Both accords supposedly prepared the ground for Hitler because they eroded the order
of 1919, thus undermining any prospects for establishing a balance of power to counter
Germany’s ‘inevitable’ revisionism.11 It is this interpretation that the following analysis
seeks to challenge. It seems noteworthy, however, that while historians have often
linked London and Locarno, neither these agreements nor the impact of British and
US policies on them have been systematically compared.12
In short, this analysis seeks to present a different, neither ‘idealist’, ‘realist’
nor ‘structuralist’ perspective. Instead, it argues that the modicum of European
stabilisation achieved after the ‘Great War’ did not result from an – elusive – revival
of pre-war balance-of-power politics. But not did it result from attempts to forge a
radically new ‘world order’ based on the League of Nations and Wilsonian ideals of
open diplomacy. Rather, what pacification there was stemmed from a formative, yet
after 1925 unsustained, transformation of Euro-Atlantic politics.
The settlements of London and Locarno were the most tangible outcomes of
this process. They became the two central pillars of the unfinished transatlantic
peace order after the First World War. Instrumental in initiating this process was the
combined effect of two stabilisation policies that, for all their shortcomings, can be
characterised as the most far-reaching bids for European consolidation in the interwar
9 Cf. Ferguson, ‘Inter-War Economy’, 258–78.
10 Cf. Schuker, The End, 385–93.
11 See H. A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 266 ff.; J. Jacobson, Locarno
Diplomacy. Germany and the West, 1925–1929 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).
12 Cf. J. Jacobson, ‘Is There a New International History of the 1920s?’, American Historical Review,
88 (1983), 617–45. There have been valuable studies of British and US policies towards Germany or
France and bilateral Anglo-US relations in the 1920s. See M. P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest. America’s
Pursuit of European Stability and French Security (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979);
R. S. Grayson, Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe. British Foreign Policy, 1924–29 (London:
Frank Cass, 1997); B. J. C. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924–
1929. Attitudes and Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); B. J. C. McKercher, ed.,
Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s. The Struggle for Supremacy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).
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period. They were pursued by the policy makers who changed the courses of British
and US policy after the Ruhr crisis. And they were premised on distinct British and
US ground rules of pacific settlement, peaceful change and integrative co-operation
between democratic states.
Who, then, were the key actors shaping Anglo-US policies in the 1920s? To
be sure, their formulation and implementation did not spring from one source.
Important impulses were given not only by statesmen but also by non-governmental
actors, notably leading financiers.13 This analysis, however, will deliberately focus on
political rather than financial decision makers. For there were indeed official actors
who became the political protagonists of peaceful change – who were instrumental
in making the ‘system of London and Locarno’. The bid of the US Secretary of
State, Charles E. Hughes, to foster a transatlantic ‘community of ideals, interests
and purposes’ in 1923/2414 will be reassessed first, and his approach compared with
the distinctly transatlantic policy of evolutionary change pursued by Britain’s first
Labour prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald.15 The Anglo-US pursuit of European
security in 1925 will then be re-evaluated, focusing first on the Conservative foreign
secretary Austen Chamberlain and his ‘noble work of appeasement’ that culminated
at Locarno.16 This will be compared with US policy under his counterpart Frank
Kellogg, who defined Washington’s role as that of a benevolent but decidedly aloof
arbiter in Europe.17
All of these policy makers unquestionably faced challenges of political disorder
that, to an unprecedented extent, were bound up with financial problems, above
all with regard to reparations and inter-allied war debts. While financial expertise
was often indispensable, all the problems underlying Europe’s postwar instability in
the 1920s ultimately required political solutions. Crucially, politicians were the only
actors who could address the crux of the European situation, the unresolved security
question.
The first argument of this study is that the reorientations of US and British
stabilisation policies under Hughes and MacDonald fostered what was indeed the
first actual peace settlement after 1918: the London reparations agreement of 1924.
Forged with France and Germany, the 1924 agreement prepared the ground for
Europe’s ‘economic peace’ of the mid-1920s. This leads to the second contention,
that this peace would have remained short-lived without the Locarno pact, the second
13 Cf. M. J. Hogan, Informal Entente. The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic
Diplomacy, 1918–1928 (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1991).
14 Cited after W. Link, ‘Die Beziehungen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und den USA’, in
W. Knapp et al., eds., Die USA und Deutschland 1918–1975 (Munich: Beck, 1978), 63.
15 Ramsay MacDonald, ‘Outlook’, Socialist Review, July 1919. The policy of the Conservative foreign
secretary Curzon in 1923 will not be considered as he was only slightly involved in the developments
analysed here.
16 Austen Chamberlain, speech in the House of Commons, 18 Nov. 1925, Hansard, vol. 188, col. 420.
See also Austen to Ida Chamberlain, 28 November 1925, AC 5/1/370. The Austen Chamberlain Diary
Letters, ed. R. C. Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 285–6.
17 Kellogg to Coolidge, 7 October 1924, Kellogg Papers, Minnesota Historical Society Archives, St
Paul, Minnesota.
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‘real’ postwar settlement. Locarno, in its turn inconceivable without the sea-change of
London, was forged under the auspices of British diplomacy, recast by Chamberlain,
but also significantly buttressed by US power. By integrating Germany, the pact
founded a western-oriented international concert, which became in essence the
political security framework of Europe’s nascent Pax Anglo-Americana.
The challenges and premises of peaceful change in the 1920s
London and Locarno have to be understood as outcomes of a wider, essentially Euro-
Atlantic stabilisation process. To explore this process, the present study proposes an
analytical mode markedly different from previous interpretations. Its first premise is
that a precise analysis of the international consolidation which British and US policy
makers could achieve after the Great War requires not only a reinterpretation of
their strategies but also a fresh look at the postwar international system, the roles
Britain and the United States played within it, and the underlying challenges of
peaceful change. To this end, two methodological approaches will be employed: a
comparative approach to national foreign-policy cultures and a systemic approach to
the history of international relations. The former draws on concepts developed by
Charles S. Maier for the study of domestic stabilisation after 1918, and the latter on
those developed by Paul W. Schroeder for nineteenth-century European history.18
Building on Schroeder’s understanding, this article posits that the international
system can only be described at one level in classical fashion as the relations, and
distribution of power, between states within a given geopolitical constellation.19 More
fundamentally, it can be characterised as a system of international politics with the system,
or constituent rules, of a ‘shared practice’, that is, the assumptions and principles actors
develop and the rules they cultivate in pursuing their often conflicting aims within the
framework of this common practice20 (here, the conduct of international diplomacy).
Put differently, this system could also be seen as providing the ground-rules of a game
which is the same for all the players involved. They shape it not irrespective of their
geopolitical position and power but chiefly according to the objectives they pursue,
the means they use and, ultimately, the possibilities they open up within it.
The ‘game’ of twentieth-century international politics had to reckon with a new,
ever more important factor largely absent in 1814 and even 1914, namely legitimacy,
particularly domestic legitimacy. Transnational stabilisation efforts and bargains were
only viable if they could be sustained not only in the international sphere but also in
very disparate domestic force-fields.21 Again, this was a challenge that politicians had
to master in the first era of democratic mass politics on both sides of the Atlantic.
18 See Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 3 ff; Schroeder, Transformation, vii–xiii.
19 See G. H. Snyder, P. Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1977), 28.
20 This follows Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). Cf.
Schroeder, Transformation, xii.
21 Cf. W. J. Newman, The Balance of Power in the Inter-War Years, 1919–1939 (New York: Macmillan,
1968).
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Building on these premises, it can be shown that the crucial change preceding
Europe’s ‘relative consolidation’ in the mid-1920s came in the ideas and assumptions
shaping British and US approaches to this two-level process. It would alter their
‘answers’ to the Franco-German question. The ability of leading statesmen to
embark on individual and collective learning processes was pivotal. Now they pursued
different strategies if previously cherished policies, and concepts, proved inadequate.22
Ultimately, post-First World War Europe could not be pacified through an ‘effective’
balance of power. It could only be consolidated if the international system’s de facto
pivotal powers, Britain and the United States, learned to fulfil their roles – and to pro-
mote stability. For although each was constrained – Britain financially, America
politically – they were the only powers that could set and transform the ground-
rules of postwar international relations. And only they could induce France and
Germany to follow suit. That they could achieve this was due not only to their
power capabilities and geopolitical positions, but to their foreign-policy cultures, the
strategies they advanced and the systemic leverage they wielded.
The First World War cast the United States into the role of the international
system’s rising hegemon. It became not merely the new ‘world creditor’ – not least
of considerable French and British war debts – but the newly predominant power
called upon to shape the rules of a liberal–capitalist world economy and of transatlantic
relations.23 Thus while neither having nor seeing a moral obligation to rescue the
Europeans from the consequences of their own follies, Woodrow Wilson’s successors
faced the fundamental challenge of providing political leadership commensurate with
American power.
In contrast to the rising power of the United States, the British Empire emerged
from the Great War victorious but weakened. Even if the empire’s expanse attained
its all-time peak in 1920, postwar Britain was more than ever a ‘Janus-faced’ power.24
The widely perceived danger of strategic ‘over-extension’, of too wide a gap between
British commitments and its diminished resources was accentuated by war debts.25
Yet even if the Pax Britannica had definitely ended in 1914, Britain remained Europe’s
essential balancing power. In the post-1918 constellation, it was to play a critical role
in ending Franco-German antagonism, not so much through military containment
as by using its diplomatic power.
What, then, were the most pressing, and what the main structural challenges to
peaceful change following the Great War? First, the peacemakers of Versailles had
aggravated rather than overcome postwar disorder. Wilson had sought to create a
radically altered system of supranational collective security based on the League of
22 There is also a new emphasis on the impact of ideas in Cold-War historiography. See J. L. Gaddis,
We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 29–31; 288–92;
M. P. Leffler, ‘The Cold War: What Do ‘We Now Know’?’, American Historical Review, 104/2 (April
1999), 501–24, 501–4.
23 F. C. Costigliola, Awkward Dominion. American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe,
1919–1933 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
24 E. Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East (London, Chatto & Windus, 1981), 74.
25 Cf. P. M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London: Fontana, 1988), 407–13.
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Nations.26 But the outcome of 1919 was an ill-founded compromise between his
vision, Georges Clemenceau’s quest for se´curite´ and David Lloyd George’s search for
peace and retribution. Chamberlain was not alone in thinking that it fell well short of
‘real peace’.27 Above all, the Versailles system was imposed on and excluded Germany.
The as yet very unsettled Weimar Republic was isolated and beset by a ‘revision
syndrome’ regarding Versailles.28 At the same time, Versailles sowed the seeds for
structural conflicts in eastern Europe. The borders of the newly recognised states
Poland and Czechoslovakia were from the outset contested even by Weimar’s most
moderate leaders. Finally, of course, when the US Senate ultimately rejected Wilson’s
design in 1920 the settlement lost what should have become its principal underwriter.
This decision became a cornerstone of Republican foreign policy in the 1920s.29
Second, at the centre of Europe’s crisis after 1919 lay the unresolved German
question, coupled with the latent Franco-German antagonism. As Keynes observed,
the reparations conflict which overshadowed Europe until 1923 was so intractable
because it raised two hard – and inextricably linked – questions:30 who would
ultimately bolster European recovery financially – and ultimately pay for the war? and
who would command the power resources that, even amid increasing international
interdependence, states still regarded as essential safeguards of their security? The
struggle over reparations provided the battlefield on which the future of the Versailles
system was to be decided. To US Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, it kept
Europe’s ‘whole economic and political life . . . in an atmosphere of war’.31
Hoover’s verdict points to a third and final challenge to peaceful change after
1919. While the League was sidelined, Europe could not be stabilised either by a
return to prewar power politics or a reining-in of Germany by force.32 The Anglo-
American alliance with France envisaged at Versailles never materialised and France’s
eastern alliances, notably with Poland and Czechoslovakia, proved insufficiently
compensatory. No US or British government after 1919 could legitimate far-reaching
commitments to France and the European status quo.
What manifested the limits of ‘containment’ politics most strikingly was France’s
futile quest for an ‘artificial’ hegemony in Europe, initiated under Raymond Poincare´
after the failure of Lloyd George’s ‘grand design’ for European reconstruction at
the 1922 Genoa Conference. Deploring the lack of Anglo-US support, Poincare´
26 Cf. T. J. Knock, To End All Wars. Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992).
27 Austen to Hilda Chamberlain, 19 July 1919, Austen Chamberlain Papers, Birmingham University
Library, AC 5/1/126. Despite recent attempts at ‘rescuing’ Versailles, this negative verdict has to be
re-affirmed. See against this M. Boemeke, G. D. Feldman, E. Glaser, eds., The Treaty of Versailles. A
Reassessment After 75 Years (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
28 See M. Salewski, ‘Das Weimarer Revisionssyndrom’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 2/80 (1980),
14-25.
29 See C. E. Hughes, The Pathway to Peace (New York: Harper & Brother, 1925), 8.
30 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London: Macmillan, 1919).
31 Hoover to Hughes, 24 April 1922, National Archives of the United States, Washington DC (henceforth
NA), RG 59/800.51/316.
32 Cf. J. Jacobson, ‘Strategies of French Foreign Policy after World War I’, Journal of Modern History,
55 (1983), 78–95.
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finally felt compelled to seek reparations, and security, unilaterally. In January 1923,
French troops occupied the strategically crucial Ruhr area. Recent studies have
underlined that Poincare´ did not desire the outright dismembering of Germany, but
rather ‘productive pawns’ and agreements with Ruhr industrialists to secure German
‘fulfilment’ – and French preponderance.33 Effectively, however, his course provoked
both German ‘passive resistance’ and an escalating conflict that by late 1923 threatened
to undermine the Weimar Republic politically, economically and territorially.
Both British and US policymakers viewed the effect of French policy with ever
greater apprehension.34 They would eventually intervene against a French incursion
that by no means furthered European stability, anticipating Germany’s division and
limited control over vital coal and steel resources after 1945. Indeed, by undermining
Weimar’s embattled republican order, it would also have eroded European peace
much earlier than 1933.35 By November 1923, then, it had become obvious, not
only for British and US observers, that there were not even the rudiments of
international ground-rules to cope with the cardinal postwar problems. Crucially,
while Germany’s co-operation was indispensable, no ways had been found to engage
it. Yet, by triggering the Ruhr conflict Poincare´ provoked the crisis that would
ultimately recast Anglo-US approaches and, in turn, recast transatlantic and European
international relations.
The political and the ‘depoliticised’ path to the London settlement
The period which began with the ‘return’ of Britain and the United States to
Europe in October–November 1923 and culminated in the London conference of
July–August 1924 was the first of two formative phases in the evolution of postwar
politics. The second was the subsequent gestation period preceding Locarno. By
late 1925, the way for the markedly more stable Europe of the ‘Locarno era’ had
been paved. Momentous decisions had terminated the Ruhr conflict and, more
importantly, altered overall relations between the Western powers and Germany.
A comparative Anglo-US perspective reveals that essentially two – in the mid-
1920s mutually reinforcing – processes were beginning to transform the international
system. The first was economically oriented and became known as the ‘expert
process’. Initiated by the US administration, it followed the design of Hughes’s
New Haven plan of December 1922. Hughes intended to overcome the reparations
conundrum by allowing financial experts to propose a solution. Subsequently,
Europe’s political pacification was to be fostered by economic stabilisation.
33 Cf. the more positive interpretation in J. P. W. Keiger, Raymond Poincare´ (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), 294 ff. and J. Barie´ty, Les relations franco-allemandes apre´s la premie`re guerre mondiale,
10 Novembre 1918–10 Janvier 1925, de l’exe´cution a` la ne´gotiation (Paris: Editions Pedone, 1977), 369 ff.
34 Chamberlain dreaded a ‘catastrophe’, Chamberlain to Birkenhead, 17 August 1923, Austen
Chamberlain Papers, AC 35/2/25; Hughes voiced similar views vis-a`-vis France’s Ambassador Jusserand,
6 November 1923, NA RG 59 462.00 R296/596.
35 Cf. Schuker, The End, 336–7; W. McDougall, France’s Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914–1924 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1978), 16, 369.
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Yet the United States, ‘depoliticisation’ strategy spurred a second, and often
underrated, process of political accommodation in Europe. Later continued under
Austen Chamberlain, this process first gained momentum in January 1924, propelled
through MacDonald’s efforts at mediation. MacDonald contributed decisively to
translating the Dawes report into a politically viable reparations – and peace –
agreement, the London accords.
‘Depoliticisation’: the United States’ Progressive approach to peaceful change
While more recent scholarship has clearly rejected earlier condemnations of what was
perceived to be the United States’ myopic isolationism after 1919, there has clearly
not been any consensus in the long-standing debate over what made the US quest
for European consolidation in the 1920s ‘futile’.36 The most far-reaching attempt
at synthesis to date is the ‘corporatist’ approach, which depicts Republican postwar
policy as shaped by an – unchanging – consensus among the ‘New Era’s’ political
and commercial elites. US interests were best protected using America’s financial
power, and informal agents, to pacify Europe by restructuring its component national
economies and politics after America’s ‘corporatist’ example.37 Such an interpretation
offers important insights into the domestic roots of US policy and the – partially –
‘private’ structure’ of transatlantic relations in the 1920s.38 More pertinently,
it places US economic diplomacy – whose spiritus rector was the long-serving
Republican Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover – in the wider context of a more
comprehensive US stabilisation policy implemented in Europe from 1923.
What can thus be accentuated is not simply corporatist continuity but, rather,
a more complex reorientation process, which progressed and regressed between
1923 and 1929, and culminated in Hughes’s bid to realise Wilson’s aims by
markedly different means. In broad terms, it comprised two stages: first, a recasting
of assumptions and ideas in a departure from Wilsonian and earlier Republican
paradigms; then, in the face of the Ruhr crisis, a change in strategy and the attempt
to bring new concepts to bear on the European conflict from November 1923.
Far from espousing isolationism, Republican foreign policy under Hughes sought
to establish a new world order. While leaving the Treaty of Versailles de jure unaltered,
he de facto aimed to reform the Versailles system profoundly. As Secretary of State,
he characterised his main objective in 1922 as the creation of ‘community of ideals,
interests and purposes’.39 It was to include not only the allies of 1918, especially France
and Britain, but also the unstable but now democratised, and capitalist, Germany. By
contrast, Bolshevik Russia was seen as neither a desirable member of nor a serious
threat to this ‘community’ in the foreseeable future.40
36 Cf. above all Leffler, Elusive Quest, 24 ff.; Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 64 f.
37 Cf. the synopsis in M. J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan. America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western
Europe, 1947–1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 1–12.
38 Cf. Hogan, Informal Entente, 38–105.
39 Cited after Link, ‘Die Beziehungen’, 63. Cf. Harding’s State of the Union Address, 12 April 1921,
Foreign Relations of the United States 1921, I, xviii–xx (henceforth FRUS).
40 See Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 87–93.
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By the end of 1922, an unspoken ‘Hughes Doctrine’ guided the Republican
quest to consolidate Wilson’s unfinished peace. The United States was to become
its informal – yet effectively hegemonic – arbiter. In Europe – where after 1919
no vital American security interests were at stake – US policy would limit itself to
an unofficial yet officially steered pursuit of hegemonic stability.41 In 1924, Hughes
defined the basic principles of his policy as: ‘Independence – that does not mean and
never meant isolation. Co-operation – that does not mean and never meant alliances
or political entanglements’.42 Formal entanglement in any universalist ‘scheme to
prevent war’ he regarded as curtailing American independence and as domestically
untenable, particularly in view of strong isolationist sentiments in the Republican-
dominated Congress. He also deemed it inimical to peaceful change and thus harmful
both to US interests and European stabilisation, which were inconceivable without
such change. This dualism remained a hallmark of Hughes’ aims.43
Gradually, following the deterioration of Franco-German relations after the
abortive Genoa conference of 1922, the hitherto predominantly economic
orientation of US foreign policy, steadfastly advocated by Hoover, began to change.44
Chiefly spurred on by Hughes, a truly Republican strategy for Franco-German
accommodation and European consolidation came to the fore, evolving into one of
the most influential approaches to international politics in the twentieth century. This
was the strategy to internationalise a ‘progressive’ model of pragmatic international
co-operation, derived from American Progressive ideas and Hughes’s own domestic
reform agenda as Republican governor of New York before the war and presidential
candidate in 1916. In his eyes, progressivism was germane to a reform of the
international system and would be sustained by the pragmatic, step-by-step ‘effort
to diminish among people the disposition to resort to force and to find a just and
reasonable basis for accord’.45
Hughes advanced the closest approximation of a US ‘grand design’ to this end in
his landmark New Haven speech of 29 December 1922. Proposing a programmatic
alternative to what he saw as Poincare´’s hazardous course, he emphasised that there
could be ‘no economic recuperation in Europe unless Germany recuperates’.46
To prevent a looming Franco-German ‘disaster’, and ensure the largest possible
reparations to the United States’ debtors Britain and France, the Secretary of State
unveiled the aforementioned ‘expert plan’ prepared by himself and his right hand,
the head of the State Department’s west European desk, William Castle.47 The plan
41 See C. E. Hughes, ‘Observations on the Monroe Doctrine’, 30 August 1923 (Washington, 1923)
and Coolidge’s State of the Union Address of 6 December 1923, FRUS 1923, I, VII.
42 Hughes memorandum, 1 July 1924, cited in H. Hyde, Charles Evans Hughes (New York: Harper &
Row, 1960), 369.
43 Hughes, ‘Address to the Canadian Bar Association’, 4 September 1923, in Hughes, The Pathway to
Peace, 8.
44 For Hoover’s ideas see his memorandum on the ‘Economic Situation of Europe’, Paris, July 1919,
Hoover Papers, Commerce Files, Hoover Institution Archive, Stanford University, box 164.
45 C. E. Hughes, ‘Address to the Canadian Bar Association’, 4 September 1923, 8.
46 FRUS 1922, II, 201. See also Hughes memorandum, 18 December 1922, Hughes Papers.
47 See Castle Diaries, Castle Papers, Houghton Research Library, Harvard University, vol. 3, 158.
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essentially sought to take the settlement of the reparations conflict out of the sphere
of power politics and put it into the hands of ‘independent’ financial ‘experts of the
highest authority’. They were to assess ‘objectively’ Germany’s ‘actual capacity to
pay’ and suggest ‘advisable mechanisms for an efficient transfer of reparations’.48
From Washington’s perspective, this seemed the only realistic path to an
intergovernmental reparations agreement. This reorientation of Republican strategy,
however, only led to concrete changes in policy when the Franco-German crisis
rapidly worsened in Europe’s ‘fateful autumn’ of 1923. The United States finally
and decisively ‘returned’ to the European theatre in November 1923, after Hughes’s
directive of 25 October that ‘the time had arrived’ for a ‘constructive policy’.49 In
concrete terms, Washington now officially endorsed the participation of US experts in
the ‘independent inquiry’ proposed almost one year before. Most prominent among
these were Charles Dawes and the businessman Owen Young.
Washington’s new course was indubitably influenced by the perception that
Poincare´, especially through the so-called MICUM (Inter-Allied Control Com-
mission for Factories and Mines) agreements with German industrialists, wanted to
create a closed Rhine–Ruhr ‘economic bloc’ which clashed with the United States’
assertion of an ‘open door’ in Europe.50 More profoundly, however, Hughes had
concluded that further US aloofness would allow the situation to deteriorate to
a point where not merely transatlantic trade but the very foundations of any future
European stability could be undermined.51 Henceforth, he became a crucial informal
arbiter, beginning what J. P. Morgan had demanded ever since 1922 and what only
politicians could do: to create the political preconditions for a success of the envisaged
expert ‘design’.52 This was indeed achieved: the United States’ forward engagement
galvanised European ‘high politics’, providing the crystallisation point lacking ever
since 1919.
Once expert deliberations had begun in December 1923, Hughes returned to a
policy of ‘neutrality’, underscoring that Washington would not become a ‘dictator
in the reparations problem’.53 Nevertheless, after the United States had set the
rules, telling the Europeans either to accept the experts’ recommendations or
forfeit US support, it became almost inevitable that Poincare´’s attempt to retain
French predominance on the premises of 1919 would be frustrated. Far less of a
foregone conclusion, however, was that this shift would also bring about tangible
political stabilisation. Essentially, this could only be achieved because US efforts
were complemented by Britain’s self-interested brokerage between the United States,
France and Germany. It fell to Labour prime minister MacDonald not merely to bring
48 See FRUS 1922, II, 199–202. Cf. Castle Diaries, 3, 177–85.
49 Hughes to US embassies in Paris and Berlin, 25 October 1923, NA RG 59 462.00 R296/33b.
50 See Hughes to Castle, 8 November 1923, Castle Diaries, 4, 211.
51 See Hughes’s memorandum after a conversation with the French ambassador, 6 November 1923,
NA RG 59 462.00 R296/596.
52 J. P. Morgan to E. C. Grenfell, 18 April 1922, J. P. Morgan Papers, New York, box 177. For different
interpretations see Hogan, Informal Entente, 38 ff.; Schuker, The End. 260 ff.
53 Hughes to the US embassies in Europe, 6 January 1923, NA RG 50 462.00 R296/13a. See also
Hughes to Logan, 12 January 1924, NA RG 59 462.00 R296/133.
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Paris and Berlin in line behind the Dawes report of 9 April 1924 but to prepare the
political ground for a sustainable reparations settlement.
MacDonald’s pursuit of an evolutionary transformation of postwar politics
MacDonald’s direction of Britain’s external relations in 1924, as prime minister and
as his own foreign secretary, marked a watershed in the evolution of British postwar
policy. His was a departure both from Lloyd George’s unrealistic ‘grand designs’
for reconstructing Europe, and from the Conservative Foreign Secretary Curzon’s
passive ‘neutrality’ policy of 1923. Yet MacDonald’s impact on Euro-Atlantic politics
has long been neglected, if at all, only raised, in the context of the broader dispute
over British ‘appeasement’. How tenable, then, is the assertion that MacDonald was
instrumental in imposing a reparations settlement on France that suited Anglo-US
finance but proved ominous for French, and European, security?54
During his nine months in office MacDonald was hardly in a position to
sustain a long-term strategy. Nonetheless, he did in effect devise Britain’s first
coherent policy of peaceful change after the Great War. And, in contrast to Curzon
as well as Chamberlain, he was the only leading British policy maker whose
approach met the central challenge of the 1920s: he sought transatlantic solutions to
political and financial problems that could no longer be mastered by the Europeans
alone.
Eventually, MacDonald departed from the previous British policy of maintaining,
however grudgingly, a superficial entente with France and the – by 1923, clearly
untenable – status quo of Versailles. Like Hughes, he pursued instead a bid to
turn the order of 1919, which he regarded merely as a temporary ‘armistice’, into
a ‘real peace’.55 He sought to achieve this by fostering a process of evolutionary
integration.56 To this end, and to enhance French and German security, MacDonald
made it a priority of his government to forge a new pragmatic partnership with the
United States. His core aim remained to draw Weimar Germany into a reformed
Euro-Atlantic ‘society’ of democratic nations.57
Prima facie, MacDonald’s approach to international politics seems characterised
by a notable tension between principle and practice. Originally, the war had
only strengthened the left–liberal convictions he had espoused as a prominent
internationalist in the ranks of the Independent Labour Party (ILP): the time was
ripe for a new world order and the League of Nations should be its universal agent
of peace.58 As prime minister, however, he opted for a decidedly pragmatic course,
and his idealism was increasingly superseded by what became most distinct about
54 Cf. Schuker, The End, 237 ff.
55 MacDonald, ‘Outlook; Cf. D. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London: Cape, 1977), 250.
56 See MacDonald’s memorandum to Ambassador Grahame (Rome), 29 June 1924, in Documents on
British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Series 1 (London: HMSO, 1984–6) (henceforth DBFP) I, XXVI, no.
493, 733 ff.
57 See MacDonald’s statements to Herriot, 8 July 1924, DBFP, I, XXVI, no. 507, 753–56.
58 Official Bulletin of the International Labour and Socialist Conference (Berne), 7 February 1919.
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his policies: his evolutionary outlook on how to improve the relations between the
victors and vanquished of a disastrous war.
In 1918, he had seen no British traditions worth building on. He had condemned
a ‘frame of mind’ that sought to restore order through a ‘Holy Alliance’ of statesmen
while only feigning ‘democratic language’.59 By late 1923, he had come to champion
nothing other than a new form of just such co-operation: that between the
governments and financiers representing the most important Euro-Atlantic powers.
Of course, these were by then governments of democratic states and MacDonald
from the beginning aimed to include Germany’s representatives. Significantly, this
concerted approach, rather than the League of Nations, had in his eyes become
Europe’s first best hope for peace.60 This was at the heart of the lessons drawn by the
Labour prime minister from Europe’s postwar turmoil. His path can indeed be seen
as one of the most idiosyncratic learning processes in the 1920s.
MacDonald consistently underlined the importance of psychological factors in
international politics, noting in July 1924 that ‘Unless we change the qualities of our
minds we had better arm to the teeth’.61 This, however, could not be achieved
through abstract covenants, only through concrete co-operation.62 MacDonald’s
pragmatism was clearly reinforced through the Ruhr conflict. As leader of the
Labour opposition he had criticised Curzon’s passivity and advocated a forceful British
intervention against Poincare´’s incursions. He warned that, unless Britain checked
France, the crisis would only benefit those eager to topple Weimar’s democratic
government and provoke another continental war.63 MacDonald later noted that
‘the worst form of German nationalism was the result of the way that Germany had
been handled by the Allies’ ever since 1919.64 Like Hughes, he dreaded the spectre
of Germany’s political and territorial disintegration and its consequences for British
trade and prosperity.65
MacDonald thus regarded the Germans as – not entirely blameless – ‘underdogs’
in the conflict with France. He sympathised with figures like President Friedrich
Ebert and the Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, whom he came to see as
guardians of Weimar’s embattled republic.66 It should be underlined, then, that
MacDonald’s resolve to accommodate Germany did not prefigure British policy
towards Hitler. His main assumption was precisely the opposite: the Weimar
Republic had to be stabilised to forestall its replacement by an anti-democratic
regime.67
59 Ibid. See also R. MacDonald, National Defence. A Study in Militarism (London, 1918), 115.
60 See minute by MacDonald, 3 July 1924, Public Record. Office, Kew (henceforth PRO), FO
371/9818.
61 Minute by MacDonald, 3 July 1924, PRO, FO 371/9818.
62 He forcefully confirmed this at the end of the London conference 15 August 1924, Proceedings of
the London Reparations Conference, 2 vols., II, PRO, CAB 29/103–4, 7–8.
63 Ibid.
64 MacDonald to Knox (Berlin), 6 May 1924, DBFP, I, XXVI, no. 462, 681.
65 See MacDonald to Crewe (Paris), 26 January 1924, DBFP I, XXVI, no. 344, 518.
66 Ibid.; MacDonald ‘Outlook’.
67 See MacDonald’s speech, 23 July 1923, Hansard, vol. 167, col. 67.
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On these premises, and forcefully seconded by the eminence grise of British foreign
policy, the Foreign Office permanent under-secretary Sir Eyre Crowe, the new prime
minister from January 1924 took not only Britain’s European policy but also its co-
operation with the elusive US partner to a new level.68 He swiftly implemented a
two-pronged strategy of peaceful change. His long-term objective remained that of
transforming the League of Nations into a flexible system of collective security. In
the short term, however, and under the leitmotif of gradual reform, he pursued two
clear priorities. On the one hand, he sought to engage the United States in preparing
the ground for a multilateral reparations agreement. He thus wholeheartedly backed
the American ‘expert’ approach, demanding the unconditional implementation of the
Dawes report.69 On the other, he embarked on separate negotiations, first with
Poincare´, then with his socialist successor Edouard Herriot and Stresemann, to initiate
what in fact became the first Franco-German peace process after the war. It was to
be a process in which French leaders and Weimar’s ‘moral elite’ – in MacDonald’s
eyes ‘sincere spirits who were truly democratic’ – had to participate on a basis of
equality.70
The British premier reasoned that a ‘comprehensive policy’ preventing further
diktats by Poincare´ would be a first critical step towards enhanced European security.71
This, however, could only be advanced under the auspices, and control, of Britain
and the United States. The divisive politics of Versailles had to be replaced by a
new transatlantic concert. With Crowe’s support, MacDonald carefully co-ordinated
his efforts with the Coolidge administration, notably Hughes. He also relied on
the leverage of J. P. Morgan and the Bank of England’s influential governor,
Montagu Norman, who strongly pressed for a reparations settlement. Yet the rationale
of his strategy remained the reverse of Hughes’s. MacDonald backed America’s
‘depoliticisation’ scheme precisely to revive the paralysed political accommodation
between the Western powers and Germany. As its culmination he proposed a
‘conference in chief ’, to be held in London in July 1924. He hoped that ‘America
might be represented’ there as well.72
In the critical phase of May–June 1924, MacDonald succeeded in furthering
Washington’s espousal of this agenda while preparing the ground for Germany’s return
to the international negotiating table. Crucially, had it not been for MacDonald’s
efforts to ensure Herriot’s presence in London – by offering France hope for renewed
British support and security commitments – no reparations settlement might ever
have been reached at all.73
68 For Crowe’s steadfast support see Crowe to Phipps (Paris), 20 March 1924, DBFP, I, XXVI,
no. 394, 587.
69 MacDonald to D’Abernon, 29 May 1924, MacDonald Papers, PRO, MDP 30/69/94.
70 MacDonald in an interview with The Times, 16 February 1924.
71 MacDonald to Phipps (Paris), 24 March 1924, PRO, FO 371/9730.
72 MacDonald to Sir Richard Grahame (Rome), on Chequers, 29 June 1924, DBFP I, XXVI,
p. 733.
73 See Foreign Office minutes of the Chequers conversations, PRO, FO 371/9749: C 10427/70/18.
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The ‘economic peace’ of 1924 and its consequences
Invoking Bismarck’s victory of 1870, midway through the London negotiations the
French premier Herriot lamented that France was on the verge of a second ‘Treaty
of Frankfurt’.74 Did the London settlement indeed mark the end not only of France’s
‘predominance in Europe’ but also of Anglo-US prospects to prevent an ultimately
hazardous resurgence of Germany in the inter-war period?75 Or did London rather
mark a different caesura?
In fact, even in France the outcome of the London conference was soon perceived
as a major positive turning-point in postwar politics, marking the end of prolonged
crisis and promising the onset of an era of consolidation. Herriot defended the
settlement as an unavoidable accommodation not only with Germany but also with
the Anglo-US powers, and he won a clear majority for it in parliament.76 In the
United States, and Germany, the grand bargain of London was regarded as the
initiation of a distinctly ‘American Peace’ in Europe.77 The Coolidge administration
quickly claimed it as a success of US policy.78 Labour’s ‘iron chancellor’, Philip
Snowden, by contrast, insisted that British mediation had been the decisive factor in
achieving a ‘new deal’ for Europe: the Labour government had managed to ‘co-opt’
the resources of the New World to redress the crisis of the Old.79
A systemic analysis which seeks to be precise about London’s impact on Euro-
Atlantic politics suggests that London was indeed far from a second ‘Treaty of
Frankfurt’ for France. Under intense international and domestic pressure, Herriot
undoubtedly suffered some tactical defeats.80 As will be shown, he had to make
difficult adjustments, especially concerning the Ruhr glacis. Overall, however,
German gains were by no means tantamount to French losses; the settlement of
1924 was everything but an upshot of zero-sum diplomacy. Rather, it constituted
a ‘new deal’ for Europe, especially for Germany’s, and France’s, economic and
political consolidation in the 1920s. Hence forward, not only French security
but also Europe’s financial and political stabilisation were no longer predicated on
Germany’s containment but on its inclusion into a nascent international system.
Within this framework, agreements were reached both through Anglo-American
pressure and, decisively, through mutual compromise. Unquestionably, this also served
core political-cum-financial interests of Britain and the United States, and both were
required to compromise least.
74 See Phipps to Foreign Office, 31 July 1924, PRO, FO 371/9863: C 12256/11642/18.
75 Cf. Schuker, The End, 346 ff.
76 See Herriot’s speech in the French Senate, 26 August 1924, Journal Officiel de la Republique Franc¸aise.
De´bats Parlementaires (Se´nat) 1924 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1925), pp. 1314–23.
77 See Kellogg to State Department, 16 August 1924, NA RG 59 R296/508; ‘America’s Part in the
“Peace of London” ’, The Literary Digest, 30 August 1924.
78 Hughes and Coolidge to Kellogg; Kellogg to Coolidge, 16 August 1924, NA RG 59 R296/
507; 509.
79 See Snowden’s statement to delegates of the British Empire, 15 August 1924, PRO, CAB 29/105.
80 Cf. Schuker, The End, 295 f.
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It has long been maintained that the outcome of London was chiefly determined
by the power of Anglo-American financiers.81 By contrast, the influence of official
policy makers has been rated low. Only the bankers could advance the initial loan
decisive for realising the Dawes scheme, and financial pressure had a marked impact on
the negotiations. But this pressure was primarily catalytic. Policy makers used it very
effectively to expedite political solutions. More substantive change stemmed from
the establishment of new rules as to Euro-Atlantic relations. MacDonald, Hughes
and his envoy Kellogg were the only actors in a position to promote crucial complex
bargains which made a final settlement sustainable not only in financial but also in
political terms.
Concretely, what policy makers had to bring about, and what bankers could
only ‘assist with’, was a resolution of the conference’s three cardinal questions.82
The first, dominating the conference’s initial inter-allied negotiations until 2 August,
was the sanction question. At stake was whether France would retain, through the
Reparations Commission, the power to enforce sanctions should Germany default
on reparations, or whether the United States would become the arbiter in this key
postwar issue. The second key question, overshadowing the second conference phase
until 15 August, was the question on what conditions, and when, France would end
the Ruhr occupation. It pertained to the very geopolitical premises of future Franco-
German relations and European security. There was one further key question, which
was on what terms, if at all, Germany – hitherto an ‘object’ of victors’ politics –
would participate in the proceedings.
That these questions could be settled was ultimately a concerted achievement.
The London settlement was the initiation of an Anglo-US peace, and provided the
framework for the first Franco-German compromise agreement after the war. It
basically resulted from a novel interplay between Britain as the politically pivotal
power and the United States as the indispensable underwriter peaceful change in
Europe. It would pave the way, and create the need, for Locarno.
The American strategy of resolving political conflicts by politically administering
economic means had lent itself to clearing the thorny path towards a reparations
settlement on ‘rational’ business terms, thus providing a decisive initial impetus.
This was subtly orchestrated by Hughes, who once again acted as informal arbiter,
first from Washington, then, at the height of the negotiations, London, where he
was officially attending the annual convention of the American Bar Association.83
He made Washington’s influence felt through three channels: first, through the US
delegation and its head, Ambassador Kellogg; second, by relying on US bankers,
above all J. P. Morgan and his associate Thomas Lamont; and, finally, by engaging
81 This reflects the views of contemporary financiers. See Lamont to Morgan & Co., 15 July 1924,
Lamont Papers, Baker Library, Harvard University, TWL 176/14. Cf. Hogan, Informal Entente, 69; K.
Burk, ‘The House of Morgan in Financial Diplomacy, 1920–1930’, in McKercher, Struggle for Supremacy,
125–57, 145–6.
82 J. P. Morgan & Co. to Morgan, Grenfell & Co., 2 July 1924, Lamont Papers, TWL 176/11.
83 See Beerits memoranda, ‘The Dawes Plan’; ‘The European Trip of 1924’, Hughes Papers, 172/27,
173/54; Pusey, Hughes, II, 587 ff.
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in direct behind-the-scenes negotiations with German and French leaders. His chief
objective remained to see the Dawes plan implemented without any undesirable
political interference or ‘measures of compulsion’; France was to evacuate the Ruhr,
Germany to accept the new reparations regime without preconditions.84
The British contribution to the London agreement – hitherto underrated – was
no less critical. MacDonald’s diplomacy turned the US scheme, essentially a set of
financial prescriptions, into a fully-fledged political settlement. This, and ensuring
that it would be concluded with the Germans meeting ‘the allies in conference’,
had remained the Labour prime minister’s underlying aims.85 As the aftermath of
London revealed, only such an agreement could set Euro-Atlantic politics on a
course of reform. For, crucially, it could be legitimated not just in Anglo-American
financial circles but also, if with difficulty, in French – and German – domestic
politics.86
At the London conference the twin processes of ‘depoliticisation’ and political
accommodation that were altering Euro-Atlantic relations reached their first peak.
As both British and American policy makers realised from the outset, the London
protocol had not as yet yielded conclusive ‘answers’ to either the reparations
conundrum or the Franco-German problem. But the agreements signed in mid-
August and implemented in the autumn of 1924 did provide, with the Dawes scheme,
a mechanism – albeit preliminary – for managing what had been at the root of
Europe’s postwar crisis. The new modus operandi reduced Germany’s obligations in
accordance with its ‘actual capacity to pay’ and allowed for the decisive initial US
transfer of capital to Germany. This quickly resulted in a lopsided transatlantic cycle
of financial stabilisation: Germany largely used US funds to pay reparations to France
and Britain, with which the latter could in turn pay off their war debts to the world’s
new lender of last resort.87
Due to Washington’s unwillingness to establish effective political control and bail-
out mechanisms for loans, this system eventually became susceptible to collapse in
the event of a major crisis. This would have grave consequences after 1928 which
were neither inevitable nor foreseeable in 1924. The more important point to make
here is that, without the Dawes regime, not even a ‘relative consolidation’ of Weimar
Germany, and Europe, would have been possible in the first place. And this became
a tangible reality between 1924 and 1928.
Appraised solely for its effect on Europe’s ‘balance of power’, the ‘economic
peace’ of London, not rescinded thereafter, had recast the distribution of means and
possibilities between Germany and France. At the same time, it had altered the very
basis for a stable peace order in the 1920s. One definite answer to the Franco-German
84 Hughes’s instructions to Kellogg, 24 June 1924, FRUS 1924 II, 32 f.
85 MacDonald to Grahame, 23 June 1924, DBFP, I, XXVI, no. 493, 734; MacDonald to Crewe,
1 July 1924, MacDonald Papers, MDP 30/69/94, no. 179.
86 Cf. P. Kru¨ger, Die Außenpolitik der Republik von Weimar (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1985), 246–7.
87 For a critical analysis see B. Kent, The Spoils of War. The Politics, Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations
1918–1932 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
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question had been given: European, and particularly French, security could no longer
be founded on a containment of Germany. Rather, it was set to retain its political and
economic unity – with as yet disputed borders in west and east – and to restore its
inherently predominant capabilities. Besides, bypassing the then economically ailing
France, it had bound up its economic and financial interests very effectively with
those of the United States and Britain.88
The most tangible systemic shift in international power was that from August
1924 onwards France was de facto deprived of its sanction prerogatives under the
Versailles system. This accorded exactly with Hughes’s main conference objective.89
Henceforth, sanctions against Germany were economic, and whether they were
imposed was no longer decided by France, or Britain, but by the United States.
Concretely, decisions would be made by a steering committee no longer set up
under Versailles but under the Dawes scheme and headed by the new ‘King of the
Dawes Plan’, the US financier Seymour Parker Gilbert.90
Following this compromise Chancellor Wilhelm Marx and Stresemann finally
received the keenly awaited invitation to London. This was not due to the bankers,
who maintained that they were ‘fighting’ the German ‘fights’ more efficiently than
the German government could.91 Rather, on the one hand, there was a further
reorientation of US policy under Hughes, who realised more clearly than before that
‘depoliticisation’ had its limits and that the Dawes plan could only be made acceptable
to both Paris and Berlin if not only French but also German leaders had a stake in it. To
draw Germany into the London process, on 3August Hughes took the unprecedented
step of holding preliminary talks with Marx and Stresemann in Berlin.92 On the
other hand, and crucially, London saw the culmination of MacDonald’s consistent
bid to promote Germany’s postwar rehabilitation. By overcoming pressure from both
Herriot and the Anglo-US bankers to exclude the Germans and secure a swift Allied
agreement, the prime minister secured perhaps the most important breakthrough of
London. The participation of a German delegation in the conference’s final sessions
led to an agreement that, in MacDonald’s words, had ‘greater moral value than the
acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles’.93
When French and German leaders negotiated for the first time since 1918,
grappling with the thorny Ruhr evacuation issue from 6 August, the need for Anglo-
US mediation became most obvious. While counting on the bankers’ co-operation,
only official mediators could enforce the indispensable ground-rules and provide
the necessary incentives – political and financial support – for what Kellogg called
88 Cf. W. Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland, 1921–1932 (Du¨sseldorf: Econ,
1970), 587; A. Orde, British Policy and European Reconstruction after the First World War (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 253 f.
89 See Hughes’ instructions to Kellogg, 24 June 1924, FRUS 1924, II, 32 f.
90 Proceedings of the London Reparation Conference (London, 1924), I, 298–301.
91 Norman memorandum, 5 August 1924, Lamont Papers, TWL 176/22.
92 See Hughes to Kellogg on his talks in Berlin, 4 August 1924, NA RG 59 R296/503.
93 MacDonald to Herriot, Paris, 8 July 1924, DBFP, I, XXVI, No. 507, 755.
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‘the politics of quid pro quo’.94 And they built narrow but passable bridges towards
compromise that both Herriot and Stresemann could cross without appearing to
have ‘sold out’ vital national interests.95
In line with J. P. Morgan, Snowden and Norman had encouraged Stresemann
to insist that France withdraw in three-month stages and complete withdrawal
in far less than a year. McDonald and Kellogg, however, seized on the bankers’
demands in their eventually decisive bid not to impose them on France. For this
would have undermined Herriot domestically and thus wrecked the entire process.96
They induced Herriot to make the final concession of proposing a maximal transition
period of one year for the evacuation.97 On 15 August, having consulted with
President Ebert in Berlin, the German delegation eventually agreed.98 Thus, a hard-
won compromise had been reached. Albeit at first less than satisfactory for either
side, its result would never be reversed. France de facto relinquished the Ruhr glacis
by 1 August 1925 – less than a year after London.
In effecting these substantial changes, the Anglo-US stabilisation policies of 1924
had by no means eliminated the structural asymmetry between the preponderance of
power actually possessed by France and Germany’s significantly greater potential. But
it is worth emphasising that any efforts at creating a more sustainable international
system without breaking up Germany, and perpetuating the disorder of 1923, had
to create ground-rules and mechanisms to balance the unsettling consequences of
this disequilibrium. In these terms the London accords marked a veritable caesura in
post-First World War international relations. Above all, the ‘new deal’ of 1924 was
the first major settlement after the war that had not been imposed on the vanquished
by the victors.
Instead, under Anglo-US auspices a series of complex multilateral bargains had
been made – on terms generally acceptable to France – which laid the groundwork
for a more far-reaching process of international accommodation between Weimar
Germany and the western powers. An integrative process had been initiated that
would determine the course of Euro-Atlantic politics until the onset of the Great
Depression in 1929. This superseded France’s earlier bids to preserve the Versailles
system in all critical respects and, in this sense, confirms MacDonald’s verdict on the
London accords: ‘This agreement may be regarded as the first Peace Treaty, because
we sign it with a feeling that we have turned our backs on the terrible years of war
94 Kellogg memorandum to Hughes, 1 August 1924, Kellogg Papers.
95 See MacDonald to Herriot, 24 July 1924, DBFPI, XXVI, no. 517, 798. Finalyson’s report on
MacDonald’s meetings with Herriot and Stresemann on 10-11 August 1924, 12 August 1924, DBFP, I,
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(Boppard: Boldt, 1973), annex 1, note 43.
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and war mentality’.99 It became the first pillar of the ‘unfinished transatlantic peace
order’ of the 1920s.
A European security question on new premises
As the aftermath of the London Conference revealed, and as British policy makers
perceived more acutely than their US counterparts, their joint efforts had improved
the preconditions but also created a new urgency for attempts to address the
underlying European security problem. Until the nadir of the Ruhr crisis, the
challenge had been the unsettled state of international relations, the absence of
security per se. After London, the crucial question was whether it would be possible
to create a security architecture that could underpin Europe’s incipient economic
stabilisation and above all the transition of a revitalised Germany towards a stable
republican order.
This challenge prompted the further reorientation of British policy under Austen
Chamberlain, in his quest for a new European equilibrium, in 1925.100 By contrast,
US policy under Hughes and even more so under Kellogg, who succeeded him
as secretary of state in March 1925, returned to a more informal, Progressive
approach. Building on the important precedent of 1924, Washington reaccentuated
the doctrine of official non-entanglement in European security. What consolidated
Europe’s ‘economic peace’, however, was not merely an intra-European endeavour
but a second stage in the transformation of Euro-Atlantic international politics of
the 1920s. Given the difference in British and US strategies, the nascent Pax Anglo-
Americana of 1924 did not, or at least not yet, give rise to a ‘transatlantic concert’ in
the sense of a coherent international system. Rather, a two-dimensional stabilisation
process – or rather two in fact highly interlocking processes of political and economic
stabilisation – gained momentum. The Locarno pact was only realised because each
of these processes reinforced the other.
The most conspicuous development was the first serious – and (west) European –
attempt after 1918 to forge a security system including Germany. And it was mainly
fostered by Chamberlain’s diplomacy. Yet Locarno politics may well have remained
futile without – and had in fact only been made possible by – a second process,
namely the political-cum-financial consolidation process initiated and overseen by
the United States.
Although insufficiently acknowledged, it was the powerful behind-the-scenes
support, and pressure, of Washington and US high finance that were instrumental
in buttressing the Locarno negotiations, especially during their most severe crisis in
June–July 1925.101 US influence was made felt by Kellogg but also by the governor
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Benjamin Strong, who became a key
99 Public statement by MacDonald, 15 August 1924, Proceedings of the London Reparations Conference,
II, 7–8.
100 See Chamberlain minute, 19 March 1925, FO 371/10756, C 3539/3539/18.
101 See the previous, more Eurocentric interpretations in Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy, 74 ff.; Kru¨ger,
Außenpolitik, 293 f. and the relatively brief treatment in Link, Stabilisierungspolitik, 344 f.
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figure in this phase. Both men recognised a vital US interest in promoting the
security pact as a political ‘insurance’ of the Dawes settlement – and Europe’s
Progressive consolidation.102 The Locarno pact would become the nucleus of a
regional security system, based on the triangular concert of Britain, France and a
reintegrated Germany. But this concert emerged, and was only possible, within
a changing international system, which was ultimately, and not only financially,
dominated by the United States. In this sense, the at first glance exclusively European
Locarno process of 1925 always had a distinct transatlantic dimension as well. And
this was only a beginning.
In the domain of ‘classic’ security politics, the Coolidge administration reaffirmed
its anti-Wilsonian premises, which led to a Eurocentric development of international
politics after London. In autumn 1924, Kellogg rejected outright the initiative pursued
by MacDonald and Herriot to reassure France by turning the League of Nations at
last, through the so-called Geneva Protocol, into Europe’s central agency of collective
security.103 In essence, the State Department suspected the emergence of a ‘new holy
alliance’ under the guise of the protocol’s ‘tightened’ regime of obligatory sanctions.
This not only threatened to affect US ‘independence’ in the American hemisphere
but also to cement the European status quo, thus obstructing further peaceful
change.104
What reinforced such notions was the fact that for Republican policy makers the
Dawes approach had acquired a no less than paradigmatic character. Such an approach
appealed precisely because it promised to further the stabilisation objectives of the
informal hegemon without entangling the United States in any formal commitments.
Creating interdependent interests with a republican Germany that espoused US-style
capitalism, and standards of pacific settlement, appeared to hold the key to overcoming
Europe’s postwar security dilemma. In US eyes, the best guarantee for France was
that Weimar’s new political and economic elites – who continued to depend on US
loans – had a stake in sustaining their western orientation.105
After the success of London, there was thus a high – and, in retrospect, excessive –
degree of confidence in the self-invigorating dynamism of financially driven
stabilisation and business co-operation. There was even the notion, asserted most
vigorously by Hoover, that the pre-1914 Pax Britannica could be replaced by a Pax
Americana. Under the auspices of the US administration semi-official representatives
like Parker Gilbert would steer the process of Europe’s progressive modernisation
following the US example.106 In Germany, rather than France, the United States
de facto created a ‘penetrated system’, as the main creditor significantly encroaching
upon German sovereignty and controlling the new reparations regime.107
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The underlying continuity in the United States’ Progressive policy was accentuated
by Kellogg, who backed his predecessor’s line unequivocally. Rather than advance
transatlantic co-operation further, however, he felt that, by the time he took over
the State Department in March 1925, Europe’s pacification was progressing so
satisfactorily that he could scale down the United States’ active engagement. In
October 1924 he had outlined to Coolidge the main lessons he had learned in
Europe. He had concluded that US policy had ‘much more influence’ if it maintained
its ‘freedom of action’ while ‘co-operating in the friendliest spirit’. The United States
‘could [not] have accomplished so much in the Dawes Plan settlement if we had been
parties in the League and . . . tied up in European politics’.108
Chamberlain’s bid for a new European equilibrium
With an international constellation in flux, it mainly fell to Britain to find a new
‘answer’ to the altered European security question of the mid-1920s. Facing this
challenge, Chamberlain, the new foreign secretary in Baldwin’s second government,
in December 1924 chose to abandon MacDonald’s support for the Geneva Protocol.
According to the assessment finally prevailing in the influential Committee of
Imperial Defence (CID), which reflected US misgivings, the Protocol challenged
paramount national interests by limiting British sovereignty and obliging it to enforce
‘automatic sanction clauses’ under an amended League Covenant. The Conservative
government refused to underpin an undesirably ‘rigid’ order of collective security
reinforcing the status quo of 1919 in Europe as a whole.109
Chamberlain’s alternative design to overcome Franco-German insecurity, his
‘noble’ policy of appeasement which led to Locarno, has received markedly divergent
evaluations. Most influentially, ‘realists’ have branded it as the pursuit of an ill-founded
compromise between regional and collective security at the expense of an entente
with France. In their view, Locarno created a deceptive truce in western Europe and
borders of inferior validity in the east, so setting the stage for a violent revision of
Versailles in the 1930s.110 More recent interpretations, however, have cast a more
benign light on Chamberlain’s quest, praising it as the ‘painful attempt’ undertaken
in the 1920s to return to ‘the best of the old [prewar] order’ – and to revive the
Anglo-French entente as its ‘central axis’.111
Yet, evaluating Chamberlain’s Locarno policy under the leitmotif of peaceful
change suggests that it was neither a flawed attempt to escape the realities of Europe’s
post-1918 ‘balance of power’ nor a laudable return to its pre-1914 roots. Rather,
it was a conscious quest to build on traditions of British policy that had shaped
the peace order of 1814/15 and to create, in the 1920s, a new concert system
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integrating Germany on terms acceptable to France. It was an idiosyncratic, and
notably Eurocentric, attempt to draw positive consequences from the previous
frustrations of British postwar policy under Lloyd George and Curzon.
To understand what the reorientation of British foreign policy in 1924/25 owed
to Chamberlain’s personal approach, rather than an overarching continuity of British
appeasement, it is worth emphasising that there were markedly differing visions of
Britain’s desirable European role in Baldwin’s cabinet. One – imperialist – school
of thought, represented by cabinet members such as the Colonial Secretary Leo
Amery and Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, clearly regarded
the empire as Britain’s pre-eminent concern. They advocated a ‘policy of aloofness’
from Europe until a ‘natural balance of forces’ had re-established itself between
France and Germany.112 Another faction, aptly characterised as ‘little Englander’
and represented by influential figures such as the cabinet secretary Maurice Hankey,
was equally opposed to any binding commitments in Europe, advocating domestic
retrenchment instead.113 It was to a large extent against these tides of Conservative
e´lite opinion that Chamberlain, aided by the still influential under-secretary Sir
Eyre Crowe, developed and implemented his strategy of reviving Britain’s role as a
European power.114
Chamberlain’s reorientation was hardly a linear process. Nor did it mark a radical
departure from British traditions of liberal hegemony. Yet it transcended mere
contingency and amounted to a significant change in the principles and objectives
shaping British policy after 1919. Just before assuming office in the autumn of
1924, Chamberlain had still favoured a balance-of-power approach predicated on
the imperative to preserve the treaty of 1919 as ‘the . . . only possible basis of . . .
Europe’s law’.115 His overriding concern had been Germany’s ‘latent’ revisionism,
coupled with its overbearing demographic and economic strength. Less likely, yet
still disconcerting, was a putative German drift towards a revisionist entente with
Soviet Russia. Chamberlain had therefore considered an alliance with France as the
best guarantee of European security.116
By March 1925, having grappled with the lessons of Versailles and the ‘Ruhr
fiasco’, Chamberlain had altered his approach, which was transformed into a policy
of re-establishing a western-orientated European concert, anchored in a quadrilateral
pact guaranteeing the inviolability of the Franco-German border on the Rhine.117
While Stresemann’s Rhine Pact initiative of late January had undoubtedly provided
112 Cf P. M. Kennedy, ‘The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865–1939’, in P. M.
Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870–1945 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983), 21 ff.
113 See Goldstein, ‘Diplomatic Strategy’, 135.
114 On Crowe’s considerable influence see S. E. Crowe, ‘Sir Eyre Crowe and the Locarno Pact’, English
Historical Review, 87 (1972), 49–74.
115 Statement in the Commons, 14 July 1924, Hansard, 5, 176, cols. 109–10.
116 Statements during the 192nd CID meeting, 16 December 1924, Cabinet Files, CAB 24/172, CP
125(25).
117 Chamberlain minute, 19 March 1925, FO 371/10756, C 3539/3539/18, Chamberlain to
D’Abernon, 18 March 1925, DBFP, I, XXVII, no. 255.
24 Contemporary European History
an important stimulus, his new design was not simply compatible with the German
proposals, but developed them further.118
Chamberlain’s guiding notion amounted to a reassertion of Britain’s capabilities as
Europe’s ‘honest broker’. He asserted ‘that Great Britain has it in her power at this
moment to bring peace to Europe. To achieve this end two things are indispensable:
1. that we should remove or allay French fears; 2. that we should bring Germany back
into the concert of Europe’.119 By this time, it had become an axiom of his policy
that neither was sufficient by itself yet that the latter – fostering Germany’s espousal of
British rules of peaceful change and the renunciation of violent revision – was clearly
inconceivable without the former.120 Conversely, he feared that, lacking British
reassurance, French leaders would feel compelled to repeat Poincare´’s provocations
towards its eastern neighbour – and Britain would then be ‘dragged along, unwilling,
impotent, in the wake of France towards the new Armageddon’.121
Put in perspective, then, Chamberlain’s ‘noble policy of appeasement’ was not
the outgrowth of internationalist idealism. It rested on the premise that, by acting as
Europe’s arbiter mediating between France and Germany, Britain was best positioned
to limit a highly undesirable security commitment in terms of military power
and economic resources. Not least, the Foreign Secretary considered the latter as
impossible to legitimate in the eyes of the Conservative Cabinet, Parliament and the
British public at large. Moreover, Britain could hope to restrict even this limited
guarantee to what was deemed Europe’s strategically vital western part, which
at this critical juncture included Germany. The remainder of eastern and central
Europe, particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia, lay beyond this strategic frontier. In
February 1925 Chamberlain memorably paraphrased Bismarck’s words: ‘No British
Government would ever risk the bones of a single British grenadier’ to defend the
Polish Corridor.122
These were important rationales for pursuing Locarno. To understand what
endowed Chamberlain’s diplomacy with a more long-term significance, however,
one has to explore his ideas and assumptions in a wider context. It is worth tracing
significant historical analogies, as interpreted after 1918. Chamberlain was intent on
applying in the twentieth century what he regarded as exemplary practices of British
peace making in the nineteenth century. When first embarking on negotiations with
France and Germany in mid-February 1925, he expounded what would become his
maxim until 1929 by emphasising that ‘the first thought of Castlereagh after 1815
was to restore the Concert of Europe & that the more ambitious peacemakers of
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Versailles, when they framed the Covenant, still left a gap which only a new Concert
of Europe could fill’.123
In essence, Chamberlain would endeavour to emulate Castlereagh in adopting a
policy of forward engagement in Europe. It was to be premised on a consistent
British commitment to shaping Europe’s international system and fostering an
international equilibrium, a balance of status and possibilities between powers of
markedly disparate power capabilities – above all Britain, France and Germany. He
opted against intervening only to readjust a ‘mechanical’ balance of power – and
thereby deal with the consequences of Europe’s foreseeable regression into crisis and
possibly another war.124
In principle and practice, then, Chamberlain began to depart from the ‘logic’
of Versailles. Yet how far did his approach meet the requirements of stabilisation
after 1918? As the Dawes process had demonstrated, in an era when the international
economy and security were inextricably linked, one newly pertinent criterion was
the extent of Britain’s capacity to co-operate with the United States. It is worth
noting, then, that Chamberlain’s reorientation failed to trigger a new readiness to
sustain the fledgling Anglo-US collaboration of 1923–24. In 1925 – admittedly in a
phase when US policy regressed to a course of official non-involvement – he saw no
benefit in engaging the United States’ political-cum-financial power to further the
security pact.125
After MacDonald, there was a return to more traditional patterns of British
particularism – and the distancing of a long-established foreign-policy culture from
one regarded as ‘arriviste’. This had marked Lloyd George’s as well as Conservative
policy towards Washington after Versailles.126 Even if a latent naval competition had
been moderated by the Anglo-US agreement underpinning the Washington system
of 1922, and a war-debt settlement concluded in 1923, a submerged rivalry between
the old and the newly rising hegemonic power persisted. This affected policy makers
more than the closely co-operating financial elites.127 Chamberlain saw US foreign
policy as the pursuit of narrow economic interests without the political will and
wherewithal to play a constructive part in international security. In March 1925, he
noted: ‘With America withdrawn, or taking part only where her interests are directly
concerned in the collection of money, Great Britain is the only possible influence
for peace and stabilisation’.128
Consequently, while throughout 1925 there were continuous consultations
between Chamberlain and Kellogg, neither seriously envisaged a transatlantic concert
of powers.129 However Eurocentric Chamberlain’s outlook was, most likely no British
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policymaker could have altered Washington’s consistent refusal to become a direct
guarantor of European stability. Under Chamberlain’s leadership, the security pact
negotiations therefore evolved essentially along European lines and without any formal
US participation. From a systemic vantage-point, however, Chamberlain benefited
considerably not only from the United States’ intervention in 1924 but also from its
continued informal engagement in 1925. Overall, US influence – financial leverage
and incentives combined with behind-the-scenes political pressure – expedited the
Locarno process not decisively but significantly.130 As a still effective ‘background
force’, it was particularly important in overcoming obstacles in international and,
even more so, domestic politics in both France and Germany.
Precisely because by spring 1925 the Dawes regime had triggered an ever-growing
influx of American capital into Germany, and thus ever more intertwined economic
interests, there was a growing US awareness that Europe’s nascent Pax Americana
required political safeguards.131 Yet both Kellogg and the influential William Castle
felt that establishing such safeguards fell squarely into the area of responsibility of
the European governments.132 Kellogg thus quickly welcomed the German proposal
for a pact ‘to guarantee French security’ when first officially notified of it on 16
March 1925.133 This was a welcome alternative both to the Geneva Protocol and a
resurfacing of European alliance politics under French influence.134
Instead of becoming the Rhine pact’s formal ‘trustee’, Washington joined with
US high finance in furthering Chamberlain’s negotiations with Aristide Briand and
Stresemann largely by the same informal means that they had used so effectively in
1924: political-cum-financial influence and capital. The Americans pursued a ‘carrot-
and-stick’ strategy: Kellogg relied on both US diplomats and financiers to underscore
the United States’ keen interest in the pact’s success. Most important among these
were the new US ambassador in London, Alanson Houghton, and Benjamin Strong,
who became the United States’ most powerful agent in Europe.
Houghton on 4 May delivered what became widely publicised as ‘America’s peace
ultimatum to Europe’, calling on ‘the peoples of Europe’ to lay the foundations
for ‘permanent peace’ if they wanted to continue benefiting from US loans.135 For
his part, Strong repeatedly travelled to Germany, providing the new Hans Luther
government with crucial support, particularly in curbing nationalist opposition to
the pact. American leverage proved vital when, in July 1925, the pre-Locarno
process threatened to collapse after France’s original response to Stresemann’s initiative
130 Earlier studies paid scant attention to the impact of America’s unofficial influence on European
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had included conditions, especially concerning German disarmament, that Berlin
considered impossible to fulfil. Meeting Stresemann and Luther in Berlin, Strong
stated in no uncertain terms what he impressed on French authorities as well: while
success in the security negotiations would ‘pay off ’, their failure would lead the
United States to withhold urgently needed investment – and, in the French case, to
maintain its undeclared loan embargo.136
The French as well as the Germans realised that US financial ‘sanctions’ could
only exacerbate the economic downturn conspicuous east and west of the Rhine
in 1925. Briand consistently emphasised domestically that France could no longer
afford to antagonise either the British and US governments or ‘the present force
which dominates Europe . . . the power of the City of London and of Wall Street’.137
In Berlin, Stresemann seized upon US demands in his efforts to win the backing
of the German National Party (DNVP). On 20 July, he declared in the Reichstag
that unless Germany extended its ‘co-operation with the financially powerful states,
with America’ he foresaw an ‘economic breakdown in Germany that would have
uncontrollable repercussions’.138
Ultimately, however, it was Chamberlain’s efforts as self-styled ‘honest broker’
between France and Germany that proved decisive for clearing the diplomatic path
to Locarno in the summer and autumn of 1925.139 Despite Britain’s unwillingness to
make automatically binding security commitments, he was the only policy maker who
could offer Briand the essential modicum of reassurance. His mediation allowed the
‘triumvirate’ of Locarno to turn Stresemann’s security initiative into a qualitatively
new peace system.140 Without Britain’s engagement, the pact would most probably
have remained stillborn.
Locarno – the European pillar of the unfinished transatlantic peace order
What, then, did Locarno politics achieve? Did Locarno’s outcome accord with
what Chamberlain had hoped to achieve and the Coolidge administration sought
to buttress? Or did it rather undermine the security of France and, even more so,
of France’s eastern allies Poland and Czechoslovakia? Essentially, Britain had fostered
the second, and this time even more far-reaching, Franco-German deal of the 1920s.
To allay French security concerns, Germany recognised the existing Franco-German
status quo on the Rhine. At the same time, it unequivocally renounced a forcible
revision of the eastern borders, but not their alteration per se – if this could be achieved
in a peaceful manner. To this end, Stresemann signed bilateral arbitration treaties not
only with France and Belgium but also with Poland and Czechoslovakia.141
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By way of quid pro quo, France recognised Germany’s claim to become again,
albeit gradually, an ‘equal’ European great power. While formally unaltered, the
unstable system of 1919 had thus in fact been significantly complemented. Since
one of the pact’s central provisions was that Germany should enter the League of
Nations the following year, on the tacit understanding that it would become a
permanent member of its council, the Locarno treaties, and Germany’s new status,
were interlocked with the League Covenant’s provisions of collective security.142
Following the British rationale, the socie´te´ des nations from 1926 essentially became a
stage for the concert diplomacy pursued by Chamberlain, Briand and Stresemann,
not a newly empowered mechanism of supranational European security.
Crucially, the stabilising impact of the transformation furthered by Locarno was
not limited to western Europe. Contrary to much that has been written since
1925, Locarno also opened up the possibility of setting Germany’s relations with
its eastern neighbours – and the means of solving mutual conflicts – on a new
footing: renunciation of force, pacific settlement, peaceful change, if, and only
if, this was reconcilable with consolidating the emerging European peace order
as a whole. Arguably, Locarno thus also offered the best prospects for Polish and
Czechoslovak security, and their peaceful coexistence with Germany, in the interwar
period. Doubtless, however, this was not universally perceived at the time, certainly
not in Poland, and progress towards an ‘eastern Locarno’ would remain one of the
hardest tests after 1925.143
At Locarno, Chamberlain effectively made the most substantial British
commitment to European security since the First World War. It was the most
far-reaching commitment possible under the constraints imposed by the need for
retrenchment and his government’s unwillingness to extend, and legitimate, formal
guarantees beyond Britain’s western security glacis. Yet Chamberlain acted on the
clear assumption that the nature of the pact was such that Britain would be called upon
to fulfil it politically but not to honour it militarily in the foreseeable future.144 In
his speech on the treaties before the Commons on 18 November 1925, Chamberlain
could thus claim with some justification: ‘I do not think that the obligations of this
country could be more narrowly circumscribed to the vital national interests than
they are in the Treaty of Locarno’.145
Undoubtedly, as the British foreign secretary had realised acutely in negotiating
with his French and German counterparts, each of them harboured different, partly
divergent ideas about what kind of peace order was to emerge in ‘the spirit of
Locarno’. These were accentuated as both had to struggle to defend the accords on
the home front. Stresemann insisted on ‘Ru¨ckwirkungen’ (‘consequences’) rewarding
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Germany’s ‘security initiative’, most urgently a swift ‘liberation’ of the Rhenish
occupation zones.146 Briand interpreted Locarno as a pact fortifying the newly settled
status quo on the basis of Versailles – and forestalling further revisions as long as
possible, particularly regarding the strategically sensitive Rhineland.147
Such differences, however, are neither uncommon in international history nor
necessarily the prima causa for the disintegration of peace orders – as long as there is
a mechanism in place by which different aims can be balanced and, as far as possible,
reconciled. Chamberlain for one had begun to recognise what was one of the gravest
diplomatic challenges after the Great War: the need to broker compromises that could
be sustained not only in international but also in domestic politics.148 Locarno was
the second settlement, after London, between Germany and the western powers that
resulted from a peace process between – more or less stable – democratic states. Its
protagonists were obliged to win approval from three distinctly different parliamentary
systems and national environments.
What was thus called for was a system of international politics allowing for complex
procedures. Locarno had to bear fruit – fast, yet not too fast – to give both Weimar’s
and the Third Republic’s moderate elites an interest in sustaining the Franco-German
peace process. With hindsight, Chamberlain was not mistaken in reckoning that
Stresemann’s Westpolitik sought to regain international equality and economic clout,
not military preponderance.149
Fundamentally, what had to be consolidated in Germany was a more far-reaching
transition process – a process of westernisation. Yet, as should be emphasised even if
obvious, the time Weimar and the Locarno system de facto had in which to consolidate
was highly constrained. Europe’s was a short ‘era of relative stability’ until 1929.150 The
larger question raised here thus pertains to the limits of what a sound international
system can at best achieve, particularly in terms of stabilising not only international
order but also the domestic politics and economies of its major actors. As Weimar’s
demise after 1929 would dramatically demonstrate, international crisis coupled with
internal radicalisation may be the root cause for a descent into aggressive power
politics and war.
It can certainly be maintained that Chamberlain came away from Locarno with
too great a belief in the effectiveness and legitimacy of what professional diplomacy
alone could accomplish. More importantly, however, at the very time when he
called Locarno ‘the beginning, and not the end, of the noble work of appeasement
in Europe’, he had in private already begun to follow a different premise.151
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This was the notion that the making of Locarno was to be Britain’s greatest
contribution to European pacification. Britain had actively laid the cornerstone
of a system in which France and Germany would hence be called upon to settle
their outstanding differences. The ‘honest broker’ would continue to lend diplomatic
support, yet saw no need for further substantial strategic initiatives, let alone financial
concessions, to advance Germany’s rehabilitation further. As Baldwin’s austerity-
minded Chancellor, Churchill, invariably emphasised, Britain had nothing to give
away in a phase of economic retrenchment, particularly by way of loans or reparations.
And Chamberlain would not fight for such causes in the Cabinet or before the British
public.152
Viewed in this light, what has been called the ‘greatest virtue’ of Chamberlain’s
policy, his renewed emphasis on reviving an Anglo-French entente as Europe’s ‘axis
of stability’ within the Locarno concert from 1926 onwards, rather merits the epithet
‘detrimental’.153 To a large extent, it allowed Briand to control, and decelerate,
the dynamism of Germany’s international integration in accordance with French
‘public opinion’. This deprived the Locarno process of crucial momentum when
its legitimisation required it most. This tendency first manifested itself at the time
of Germany’s obstructed attempts to join the League of Nations, the second of
which finally succeeded, in September 1926. The reorientation of British policy after
Locarno proved counterproductive, rather than conducive, to fostering an equitable
Franco-German peace process - and a new European equilibrium.
Criticism of Britain’s lack of sustained engagement, however, should not diminish
the paramount significance of Locarno for Europe’s ‘relative stabilisation’ in the
1920s.154 The settlement constituted the best possible security framework for Europe’s
incipient ‘economic peace’ of 1923–24. And, ground-breaking for the development
of international politics, Chamberlain’s hope to establish a new concert system had
essentially been fulfilled. For the first time after the upheaval of 1914–18, a political
modus operandi had been developed to settle the critical security dimension of the
Franco-German question. In the 1920s, this pivotal problem could only be mastered,
if at all, through political accommodation. And under British auspices, ‘Locarno
politics’ had proved effective in forging the indispensable ground-rules to this end –
as in 1924, the rules of do ut des bargains between the continent’s main western and
newly western-orientated powers.
Locarno was only a ‘nucleus’. Yet it had the potential to give rise to a more
profound transformation of Europe’s postwar order, which hinged on Weimar
Germany’s integration. It was not inherently flawed, nor was its disintegration
inevitable. Nevertheless, the nascent Locarno system was ‘merely’ the main political,
and European, pillar of a more far-reaching western international system emerging
in the 1920s. It was a Euro-Atlantic peace system, now extended towards Germany,
whose tacit underwriter and in many ways pre-eminent power was de facto the
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153 Cf. Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy, 44 ff.
154 Cf. the appraisal in Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe, 579–80.
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United States. In this sense, not the security pact alone, as Chamberlain would
have it, but the combined achievements of London and Locarno marked ‘the real
dividing line between the years of war and the years of peace’ in post-First World
War Europe.155
In sum, then, what began to stabilise Europe in the mid-1920s were two
interdependent and complementary transformation processes. There would have
been no Locarno pact without the initial impetus of London and Anglo-US co-
operation in 1923–24. Conversely, this impulse would have been ephemeral without
Locarno. British and US policy makers, and their French and German counterparts,
had started to pursue new ways of peaceful change because the postwar status quo
had proved inherently unstable. Theirs can indeed be characterised as a – in many
respects limited – learning process, attempts to draw lessons not only from the war
and the ‘truncated peace of Versailles’ but also from the Franco-German crisis it left
in its wake. The upshot was a tangible gain in European stability and security: the
founding of a nascent transatlantic peace order between 1923 and 1925.
Thus refocused, a comparative analysis allows a re-assessment of the significance of
the 1920s, marking it as a formative decade in the attempts to forge a more sustainable
Euro-Atlantic international system in the twentieth century. For it anticipated the
terms on which more durable stability could be achieved in the West after 1945 –
and in Europe as a whole after the end of the Cold War. The central challenge for
international politics has remained that of overcoming Europe’s divisions: to create,
first, a viable peace system in the west and then to extend it, from a western nucleus
including Germany, to the east. Euro-Atlantic peace has depended on the creation
of a new international equilibrium under the aegis of two pivotal, and more or less
benign, powers, rather than on a ‘salutary’ balance of power. This process has to be
understood as evolving originally under the auspices of a ‘failing’ yet still very potent
British power. Even more, however, it was shaped under the auspices of the United
States. The twentieth century was to become an American century – yet only after
the cataclysm of a second world war.
155 Press statement, 23 October 1925, quoted in C. A. Macartney, ed., Survey of International Affairs
1925, II (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), 56.
